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1. Introduction 
Moebius Syndrome (MS) and schizophrenia may initially seem to have little to do 
with one another. The former is a rare congenital neurological disorder primarily 
characterised by bilateral facial paralysis and lateral eye movement incapacity; the latter is a 
psychotic disorder, typically involving delusion or hallucination, with largely unknown 
etiology. However, closer examination of the experience of individuals with MS and 
schizophrenia, respectively, reveals some intriguing points of convergence—along with some 
important divergences, too. These convergences tend to revolve around the way individuals 
with MS and schizophrenia experience their embodiment and affectivity.   
In this comparative study, we examine such experiential manifestations in MS and 
schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these 
experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions and that 
such an understanding may have therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of 
phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis of pathological conditions can shed light 
on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and 
interpersonal relatedness in normal conditions.  
 
2. Phenomenological structures of embodiment and affectivity 
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Phenomenologists argue that distinctively human forms of thought, perception, and 
affect are profoundly shaped by both the sort of bodies we have, as well as the things they 
can do. The body (and its sensorimotor capacities) anchors us in our world and, as we shall 
see, acts as a mediator enabling the world to appear to us, experientially, in characteristic 
ways. Phenomenological approaches to the body are particularly interested in articulating the 
lived structures of embodiment; they are concerned with investigating how various 
dimensions of embodiment are experienced. This experiential orientation leads 
phenomenologists to famously distinguish between two dimensions or modes of embodiment: 
(1) the body through which we pre-reflectively live, i.e., the body considered as a subject 
(Leib); and (2) the body thematically perceived by me and by others, i.e., the body considered 
as an object (Körper) (Husserl 1989; Merleau-Ponty 2002; cf. Carman 1999).  
The body-as-subject refers to the way that embodiment is lived through from the first-
person perspective. From this perspective, the body is not something explicitly perceived or 
reflected on—in the manner, for example, that we might critically scrutinize parts of our body 
and vow to get more exercise. In the latter case, where the body receives explicit thematic 
attention, we are concerned with the body-as-object. By contrast, the body-as-subject is not 
really a content of experience but rather a tacit, pre-reflective structure that organizes 
experience. By “pre-reflective”, phenomenologists simply mean to characterize the manner in 
which the body is implicitly present as we perceive and act on the world, dynamically 
shaping both what we experience and how we experience it. In this sense, the body-as-
subject, at least when functioning optimally, serves as the transparent medium for experience 
(Gallagher 2005). 
For example, when we see and reach for a mug of coffee on our desk, we don’t first 
consciously locate our arms in space and then intentionally adjust our posture and monitor 
our movements as we initiate and carry through with the reach. We simply reach for the mug.  
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We’re able to spontaneously do so because of the transparent background work of the body-
as-subject. Due to ongoing information from proprioceptive and kinaesthetic processes (along 
with visual and tactile information), we are pre-reflectively aware of the location of our limbs 
without needing to explicitly attend to our body on a moment-to-moment basis. To use 
language that will be important later, we enjoy an immediate experiential intimacy with our 
body and its attendant capacities. Moreover, based upon our spatial position and bodily 
capacities, we are also aware of what sort of movements and actions are possible within a 
given space. The body is thus always tacitly present and poised for action. The lived body (or 
the body-as-subject) in this way serves as our anchored first-person perspective on the world, 
grounding our egocentric frame of spatial reference by which we are disclosed to ourselves as 
bodily subjects situated in the world (Legrand et al 2007). 
But the body-as-subject also shapes experience in another way. When we perceive the 
coffee mug, we don’t simply see it in objective or recognitional terms, say, merely as a thing 
instantiating different properties such as color, shape, texture, etc. Rather, the coffee mug is 
perceptually disclosed as meaningful. An important aspect of our experience is thus to 
perceive the mug as soliciting a range of potential actions (grasping, picking up, throwing, 
etc.), specified both by our body’s sensorimotor capacities as well as by the context in which 
we encounter it (in the kitchen, on the desk in our study, in the dishwasher, etc.) (Gibson 
1979). In this way, the body-as-subject functions as a transparent constraint on our 
experience of self and world. Although it doesn’t show up as an object like other objects in 
the world, the body-as-subject is nevertheless “always near me, always there for me”, as 
Merleau-Ponty observes; yet “it is never really in front of me…it remains marginal to all my 
perceptions” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.104). Similarly, Sartre writes that “the body is present 
in every action although invisible…The body is lived and not known” (Sartre 1956, p.427). 
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Of course, the body can, and often does, become an object of thematic attention. In 
contrast to the first-person perspective of the body-as-subject, we can adopt a third-person 
perspective on our body. For example, we can scrutinize individual body parts such as the 
hand we hold up in front of us or the flabby midsection we gaze at disdainfully in the mirror. 
Usually, the body-as-subject effaces itself within the fluid performance of world-directed 
actions—again, it remains in the background, “marginal to all my perceptions”, as Merleau-
Ponty puts it—but if something breaks down or goes wrong, our body suddenly moves to the 
foreground of our attention: for example, if we feel lower back pain while reading at our desk 
or stumble while reaching for a passing shot during a tennis match. In these cases, we become 
abruptly aware of our body as a thing impeding our action. Rather than tacitly organizing and 
enabling experience, it now explicitly disrupts it; when the implicit body-as-subject becomes 
explicit (i.e., a thematic object), the usually inhabited or automated bodily processes 
characterizing the transparent functioning of the body-as-subject become disturbed (Fuchs 
2005).    
In addition to distinguishing these two modes of embodiment, phenomenologists 
argue that descriptions of embodied experience are incomplete without a consideration of the 
way they are mediated by various forms of affect: emotions, moods, and other feeling states. 
For example, we experience or relate to our body and its capacities differently when tired or 
anxious, say, in contrast to when we feel energetic or elated. Moreover, these affective 
dimensions of embodiment shape how the world shows up for us in our experience. 
Heidegger famously argues that moods are world-disclosing: “The mood has already 
disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to 
direct oneself toward something” (Heidegger 1962, p.176). This phenomenological 
observation about the world-disclosing power of affect is supported by different empirical 
studies. In one series of studies, subjects were found to estimate the incline of a grade to be 
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steeper when wearing a heavy backpack as opposed to not wearing one, or feeling fatigued as 
opposed to refreshed (Proffitt et al 1995; 2001). Another study found that subjects’ 
perception of grade incline is even shaped by psychosocial factors and their associated 
affects. Individuals judged hills steeper when alone than when in the presence of a supportive 
partner, or even when simply imagining the presence of a supportive partner (Schnall et al. 
2008).  
In sum, phenomenologists argue that basic structures of embodiment and affectivity 
modulate our experience of self, others, and world; our bodily presence to self and world is 
mediated by affectivity (Colombetti 2014; Ratcliffe 2008; Stanghellini and Rosfort 2013). 
How this is so—and how these bodily and affective structures, as well as their modulatory 
effects, may be altered in MS and schizophrenia—will be more apparent in the subsequent 
analysis. To be clear, in what follows, we neither posit that the quality of the experience of 
diminished embodiment and affectivity nor that the nature of the underlying structural 
disruptions is identical in MS and schizophrenia. Rather, we suggest that the disruptions of 
embodiment and affectivity in MS and schizophrenia and their diverse experiential 
manifestations highlight the importance of these basic structures for the constitution of a 
sense of self and worldly relatedness also in normal conditions. 
 
3. Diminished embodiment and affectivity in MS and schizophrenia 
MS is a very rare form of congenital oculofacial paralysis, typically complete and 
bilateral, resulting from maldevelopment of the sixth and seventh cranial nerves; estimations 
suggest that MS affects approximately 0.0002-0.002% of births (Kuklik 2000; Verzijl 2003). 
Along with oculofacial paralysis, which leads to atrophy and gives the face a smooth 
complexion with a slack half-open mouth, individuals with MS also exhibit other 
abnormalities: abnormal tongue, hypodontia (i.e., missing teeth due to developmental failure 
 6 
 
[tooth agenesis]), difficulty sucking and eating, limb defects (such as club foot or syndactyly 
[i.e., abnormal connection of fingers or toes]), and general problems with motor skills, 
coordination, and balance (Miller and Strömland 1999). In light of these physical 
abnormalities, it may seem trivial to characterize MS as involving a disruption of 
embodiment. However, as we shall see, there are subtle phenomenological alterations of 
embodiment, affectivity, and self-experience in MS that resist an exclusively 
neurophysiological characterization.   
In the case of schizophrenia, phenomenologically informed psychopathologists have 
long argued that the generative disorder of schizophrenia is a disturbance of the self. This 
basic intuition was developed more or less explicitly in nearly all foundational texts on the 
concept of schizophrenia (e.g., Bleuler 1911/1950; Jaspers 1913/1997; Berze 1914; 
Minkowski 1927; Schneider 1959). For example, Minkowski argued that schizophrenia “does 
not originate in the disorders of judgment, perception or will, but in a disturbance of the 
innermost structure of the self” (1997, p. 114). Crucially, the ‘self’ disturbed in schizophrenia 
does not refer to complex linguistically- or conceptually-mediated levels of selfhood, such as 
narrative identity or personhood, but to what has been called the ‘minimal self’ (Zahavi 
2005), ‘core self’ (Damasio 2010) or ‘ipseity’ (Sass and Parnas 2003). Within the 
phenomenological tradition, ipseity refers to a fundamental configuration of consciousness, 
i.e., its first-personal givenness; the concept of ipseity strives to capture the implicit sense of 
coinciding with oneself and one’s experiences at any given moment (Sass and Parnas 2003).   
For example, when we perceive or reflect upon something, we are implicitly or pre-
reflectively aware that we are the one who perceives or reflects; there is no distance between 
our experience and ourselves. To put it differently, the self, in this minimal sense (ipseity), is 
not something prior to or below the flux of experience, somehow linking it together, but a 
feature of the very manifestation of experience (Henry 1973). This self-presence or self-
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intimacy usually permeates all our experiential modalities and secures an elusive yet enduring 
and vital feeling of “I-me-myself”. In schizophrenia, however, this basic sense of self-
intimacy is often threatened or rendered unstable. As Schneider (1959) puts it, “[certain] 
disturbances of self-experience show the greatest degree of schizophrenic specificity. Here 
we refer to those disturbances of first-personal givenness (Ich-heit) or ‘mineness’ 
(Meinhaftigkeit)” (1959, p.58; quoted in Parnas and Henriksen 2014, p. 252). In 
contemporary phenomenological psychopathology, the disturbance of the self in 
schizophrenia is most comprehensively articulated in the so-called ipseity disturbance model 
(Sass and Parnas 2003), which involves two complementary distortions: diminished self-
affection (i.e., attenuated sense of existing as a living subject of awareness and action) and 
hyper-reflexivity (i.e., exaggerated and alienating forms of self-consciousness). 
During the last two decades, empirical research has consistently documented that 
certain anomalies of self-experience (i.e., ‘self-disorders’) aggregate significantly in 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders but not in other mental disorders (for a review, see Parnas 
and Henriksen 2014). In brief, self-disorders are non-psychotic, experiential anomalies. They 
exhibit a trait-like quality, typically date back to childhood or early adolescence, and they 
tend to persist after remission from a frank psychotic episode. As we shall see, some of these 
self-disorders reflect alterations in the basic sense of self-presence and embodiment (vide 
infra; cf. Parnas and Handest 2003; Sass and Parnas 2003; Parnas et al. 2005; Henriksen & 
Parnas 2012). Within the phenomenological literature, Stanghellini (2004; 2009) and Fuchs 
(2005) have argued that an essential feature of schizophrenia is a specific kind of 
disembodiment. Stanghellini (2004) employs the terms of “disembodied spirits” and 
“deanimated bodies” to describe a peculiar kind of mechanization or objectification of the 
body-as-subject in schizophrenia. Fuchs (2005) similarly describes a “disembodiment of the 
self” in schizophrenia in which the lived body’s usual transparency becomes opaque and 
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hinders the patient from inhabiting the body in the usual, unproblematic sense. On both 
Stanghellini’s and Fuchs’s account, disembodiment in schizophrenia is intrinsically tied to 
the basic disturbance of ipseity.  
  
4. Experiential manifestations of diminished embodiment and affectivity  
With these phenomenological concepts in place, we now explore disruptions of 
embodiment and affectivity in MS and schizophrenia. First, we explore MS before turning to 
schizophrenia. Although MS has received considerably less attention than schizophrenia—
likely due to its rarity—there are nevertheless sources available that can help highlight 
experiential dimensions of this condition pertinent to the present discussion. 
In a series of books and papers, Jonathan Cole (e.g., 1997, 1998, 2009, 2014) has 
collected narratives of people living with MS—first-person insights into the subtle alterations 
of embodiment and affectivity distinctive of this condition. For our purposes, it is noteworthy 
that many individuals with MS report persistently experiencing an attenuated sense of their 
body-as-subject; rather, they appear to predominantly experience their body in a markedly 
impersonal, almost object-like way. This is an especially prominent feature of their early 
childhood experience. Cole and his co-author Henrietta Spalding (who has MS) seek to 
capture this type of bodily experience with their notion of the MS subject as “Cartesian child” 
(2009, p. 41), emphasizing how a lack of bodily intimacy, which people with MS often 
report, may lead to a persistent sense of detachment or alienation from one’s own body. For 
example, James (now in his fifties), describes how this experience has been with him as long 
as he can remember: “I have a notion which has stayed with me over much of my life—that it 
is possible to live in your head; entirely in your head (…) I think there’s a lot of dissociation. 
But I think I get trapped in my mind or my head” (Cole and Spalding 2009, pp. 68, 72). 
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Another individual, Celia, describes an even more articulated sense of disembodiment which 
she claims shaped her fundamental sense of self from a very early age:  
I never thought I was a person; I used to think I was a collection of bits. I thought 
I had all these different doctors looking after all the different bits…‘Celia’ was 
not there; that was a name people called the collection of bits. I did not like my 
feet; I liked my spirit because I was strong as a child. I like my brain…Even 
though I was a collection of bits I always knew there was something strong inside 
that I had a mental dialogue with, but it was not the physical body; it was very 
separate from the physical (Cole and Spalding 2009, p. 42).  
Celia describes here a profound lack of bodily self-intimacy; she regards herself not as a 
locus of agency and experience but almost as object-like, as a disparate “collection of bits”. 
This lack of self-intimacy meant that she never experienced herself as fully immersed in the 
spontaneous movements, play, and intersubjective reciprocity that are crucial parts of 
childhood development (Cole and Spalding 2009, p. 56; cf. Trevarthen 1992). Although this 
lack of self-intimacy has diminished somewhat in adulthood, it nevertheless seems that Celia 
still does not have a robust sense of her body-as-subject. She does not experience her body as 
a fluidly integrated unity—a tacit, smoothly functioning system facilitating her interactions 
with the world and others. Instead, Celia reports consistently adopting a third-person 
perspective on her own body, including occasions (e.g., gesturing while speaking) when the 
body would normally recede transparently into the background.  
All my gestures are voluntary, even now aged 46. Everything I do, I think 
about…All the things I am doing, whether turning my head or moving my hands, 
is all self-taught. I learnt from observation as an adult…When I was a child, I 
could not gesture, because I was a collection of bits. My body was not me, so 
expression in it, with it, would not be from me either. It was not a joined-up 
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feeling. There was a huge bit missing; with the lack of balance, mobility, and 
problems with coordination, you don’t get a sense of self… (Cole and Spalding 
2009, p. 190; our emphasis).   
Bereft of an enduring sense of bodily self-intimacy and attendant sense of self, Celia thus 
adopts a hyper-reflective stance toward her body, gestures, and actions. She consciously 
monitors and pays attention to her body instead of pre-reflectively living through it (as we 
shall see below, this hyper-reflective stance is reminiscent of some patients with 
schizophrenia). Others with MS offer similar accounts. For example, James says he’s only 
recently begun using his arms to gesture while speaking—but it continues to be a deliberate, 
effortful exercise (Cole and Spalding 2009, p. 74). Similarly, Lydia says that, “Instead of 
facial expression I use my hands and shoulders, and my voice, both in its tone and what I say; 
I construct it all very carefully…I have to monitor these things all the time…None of this is 
automatic” (Cole and Spalding 2009, p. 152). She reports consciously studying how others 
gesture and express emotions and then, over time, deliberately incorporating these practices 
into her own repertoire.  
To return to some concept introduced earlier, the phenomenological significance of 
these first-person accounts is that individuals with MS often feel as though they do not 
wholly coincide with their lived body, their body-as-subject. Instead, the body is typically 
related to, or experientially manifest, as an object. And this diminished sense of bodily self-
intimacy may be associated with diminished affectivity. Some individuals with MS report 
feeling a qualitative “absence” or diminishment in their emotional life. For example, Eleanor 
says, 
[I]f I go back to my late teen years, I was not very embodied as a person and the 
physical nature of attraction was some way away…At this stage, I did not feel 
anything [i.e., romantic] physically; even though I had matured physically, I had 
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no feeling. Like the other feelings it had not kicked in (Cole and Spalding 2009, 
pp. 169-170). 
Along the same lines, James reports that he intellectualizes feelings instead of living in and 
through them: “I sort of think happy or I think sad, not really saying or recognizing actually 
feeling happy or feeling sad”. This intellectualizing tendency even includes his experience of 
falling in love with his wife: “I think initially I was thinking I was in love with her. It was 
some time later when I realized that I really felt love”) (Cole and Spalding 2009, pp. 72, 70). 
With respect to his embodied and affective life, he further states, “I’ve often thought of 
myself as a spectator rather than as a participant” (Cole and Spalding 2009, p.72). Finally, 
Celia describes similar emotional experience dating back to childhood: “I did not express 
emotion. I am not sure that I felt emotion, as a defined concept. At my birthday parties I did 
not get excited. There were people around excited, but I followed what they did” (Cole 2008, 
p. 244). She continues: “I don’t think I was happy, or even had the concept of, happiness as a 
child. I was saddened by being in pain or having horrid things like a blood test” (ibid.). 
Surely Celia was capable of feeling some emotion. What these quotes appear to suggest, 
rather, is not an utter absence of emotion but more likely a restricted range of emotional 
sensitivity, responsivity, and expressivity (Krueger and Michael 2012; cf. Krueger 2014, 
p.147-152).  
In sum, we have seen that individuals with MS often experience a diminished sense of 
embodiment, which is consequential of but, in our view, not reducible to their specific 
physiological abnormalities. In other words, the typically persistent and pervasive lack of 
bodily self-intimacy does not pertain exclusively to, as might be predicted, oculofacial 
paralysis but to a more general overall feeling of being disconnected and at a distance from 
one’s body-as-subject. Invariably, this experiential distance entails a feeling of bodily self-
alienation (variously reflected in complaints such as feeling ‘trapped in my mind or my 
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head’, ‘separation from the physical body’, ‘collection of bits’, etc.) and, at least in the cases 
we have discussed, an interdependent, observational or self-monitoring stance toward one’s 
own body, agency, and gestures as objects, which may further increase feelings of alienation. 
This experiential distance can also affect the individuals’ emotional life to the extent that 
emotions appear as if ‘absent’ (as in the case of Eleanor) or only accessible through reflection 
or ‘intellectualization’ (as in the case of James) rather than pre-reflectively felt and lived 
through. In our view, these forms of diminished embodiment and affectivity, which revolve 
around disruptions of the usually taken-for-granted and implicit processes of the body-as-
subject are central to the experience of being disconnected from oneself in MS (reflected in in 
statements such as ‘being a spectator to rather than as a participant in one’s own life’, ‘not 
feeling like a person’, ‘lacking a sense of self’, etc.).  
We now turn to schizophrenia. As we shall see, there are certain illuminating 
similarities between experiences of diminished embodiment and affectivity in MS and 
schizophrenia. However, when unravelling the phenomenological complexities of these 
experiences and their embeddedness in the underlying psychopathological Gestalt of 
schizophrenia, some crucial differences come to light, gravitating especially around 
disturbances of ipseity.  
Many patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders experience problems with their 
embodiment. For example, “K”, 25-year old, describes a complicated relationship with her 
own body: 
I have always had a difficult relation to my body (…) It’s as if there is a distance 
between my body and my mind. It’s like my mind is a little puppeteer, sitting far 
away, controlling my body. It’s not like I see myself from above or something. 
But it’s like I’m not in my body or not attached to it. It’s like my body is an 
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appendix that hangs below me. My body feels alien to me (…) I wish I could be 
free of it (Henriksen and Nordgaard, in press). 
Here, “K” describes phenomena that in the clinical, self-disorders oriented research literature, 
are called ‘psycho-physical split’, referring to the experience as if the mind and the body 
somehow do not fit together or are disconnected, and ‘somatic depersonalization’, referring to 
the experience of perceiving one’s own body or parts of it as strange, alien, disconnected, etc. 
When “K” describes her mind as a “puppeteer”, she is not describing an out-of-body 
experience (“It’s not like I see myself from above or something”). Rather, she is conveying 
an experience of not feeling truly present in her body and alienated from it (“it’s like I’m not 
in my body or not attached to it”; “My body feels alien to me”). Such experiences are quite 
common in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, though their specific quality and articulation 
may vary—for example, “the body feels awkward as if it does not really fit. It feels like the 
body is not really me, as if it is rather a machine controlled by my brain” (Henriksen and 
Nordgaard 2014, p.437) or “I feel strange, I am no longer in my body, it is someone else; I 
sense my body but it is far away, some other place” (Parnas and Handest 2003, p. 127). In 
schizophrenia, diminished embodiment may take on an alien or quasi-mechanical character: 
“I’m blessed with a bladder-emptier that I can turn on and off, and an anal expeller” (Angyal 
1936) or “I’m a psycho-machine” (Kimura 1997).1 For Peter, 18-years old, his initial, non-
psychotic experiences of psycho-physical split, somatic depersonalization, and loss of control 
of bodily movements evolved into vague ideas about external influence (“it sometimes feels 
as if someone else is performing my actions. It’s as if it’s not me. I feel like a puppet”) and 
eventually into psychosis with delusions of control (Henriksen & Parnas 2012, p. 659). 
 Most importantly, the unstable self-presence or self-intimacy in schizophrenia is not 
restricted to the bodily domain but is also often pervasively manifest in other modalities of 
consciousness (thinking, perceiving, feeling, etc.). For example, Peter describes persistent 
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feelings of not being fully present in the world: “It’s as if I’m inside a glass dome (…) 
everything seems so far away as if there is an invisible wall I cannot penetrate” (Henriksen & 
Parnas 2012, p. 658). Experiences of ‘diminished presence’, which also are manifestations of 
the disturbance of ipseity, often entail a felt distance toward the world and may involve a 
decreased capacity to become affected, touched or moved by others or events and to 
emotionally respond to such stimulations. This is the case for Peter, who states, “I don’t truly 
feel the world, because I don’t feel anything inside”; he refers to the world as a “dream 
world” and himself as a “zombie” or “a shell devoid of emotions” (Henriksen & Parnas 2012, 
p. 659). Such experiences typically affect the spontaneous immersion in the shared social 
world and the ability to interact with others in a smooth, fluid, and context-sensitive manner. 
The failing sense of self-presence may also be associated with an experience of not being 
fully awake, as if the very luminosity of consciousness was somehow diminished—for 
example, “I am only 70% conscious” (Cermolacce et al. 2007, p. 706); “I feel a sort of 
emptiness in my head as if I am not awake. I feel detached or airy as if I am not present” 
(Henriksen et al., in press); “My consciousness is not as whole as it should be”; “I am half-
awake” (Parnas and Handest 2003, p. 125).  
 Furthermore, many patients with incipient schizophrenia describe a variety of 
interdependent cognitive disturbances. Some of these are worth highlighting here because 
they indicate important differences between schizophrenia and MS, which should not to be 
overlooked. For example, some (not all) thoughts, typically with a neutral or trivial content, 
may appear somehow alien or anonymous to the patient as if he himself has not generated 
them (“my thoughts feel strange as if they aren’t really coming from me” [Henriksen & 
Nordgaard 2014, 436f.]. ‘Thought pressure’, i.e., the experience of having many thematically 
unrelated thoughts or trains of thought occurring simultaneously or immediately after each 
other, with a loss of meaning, is another frequently found experience in schizophrenia 
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spectrum disorders; one patient described this experience with the analogy of “rockets 
shooting in all directions at once. It’s one big chaos” (Henriksen & Nordgaard 2014, 437). 
‘Thought pressure’ may be linked to ‘spatialization’ of thoughts, i.e., an anomalous 
experience of thoughts not as subjectively lived-through but rather as quasi-objective things, 
for example, localized to specific parts of the brain, physically moving around inside the head 
or pressing on the inside of the skull. Patients also often report listening to their own thoughts 
spoken aloud internally with they own voice or reading their own thoughts as if they were 
subtitles on a film. In brief, these various experiences testify to the fact that the unstable sense 
of self-presence or self-intimacy in schizophrenia transcends beyond the bodily and affective 
dimensions into other modalities of consciousness, which, by contrast, appear unaffected in 
MS (e.g., cognition, perception, etc.).    
 Finally, we will return to “K” and briefly discuss some of the problems she 
encounters when interacting with others: 
I always feel that it is like enormously feigned when I have some social 
interaction. It feels false, like I can’t react naturally or sincerely like everyone 
else… I have the experience that there are two of me: the one that interacts with 
someone and then there is the real me, who sits there behind. For example, ‘I 
sense that the one I’m talking to finds my statement a little transgressive, so I add 
a little humour here to establish an ironic distance. That may perhaps… yes, that 
worked well…’ And I do it, like, simultaneously. I don’t feel present at all 
(Henriksen and Nordgaard, in press). 
Here, “K” describes hyper-reflectivity that takes the form of an excessive self-monitoring, 
operating alongside her social interaction and compromising her sense of being present in 
social situations. With regard to certain aspects (e.g., hyper-reflection, self-monitoring), her 
description may appear similar to those of patients with MS (e.g., Henrietta’s and Lydia’s 
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similar reports of self-consciously monitoring every gesture and movement when interacting 
with others). However, we should not fail to notice the underlying schizophrenic vulnerability 
that is also indicated in this vignette (for example, “I have the experience that there are two of 
me…”), which clearly distinguishes “K’s” difficulties from those of patients with MS. Her 
feeling of social interactions being “false” and of not being able to “react naturally or 
sincerely like everyone else” is deeply rooted in her persistent feeling of not being truly 
human, which dates to early childhood—“I feel like I’m not a natural human being or a 
proper human being or something like that” (ibid.). The unsettling feeling of being radically, 
yet often ineffably, different from others is very common in schizophrenia and typically at 
the very heart of the patients’ suffering 
In sum, we have discussed various clinical examples of diminished embodiment and 
affectivity in schizophrenia that gravitate around disruptions of the first-personal articulation 
of experience. As we have seen, the ipseity disturbance gives rise to a multiplicity of 
interconnected and mutually implicative anomalous self-experiences that threatens one’s 
most intimate, foundational sense of self and enables a radical form of self-alienation to grow 
from within the disturbed subjectivity, potentially resulting in psychotic experiences of being 
controlled by an external force, persecuted or addressed by a hallucinatory other. 
 
Conclusion 
 
On a surface level, we found similarities among experiences of diminished 
embodiment and affectivity in MS and schizophrenia, respectively. These include hyper-
reflection, self-monitoring, and profound bodily self-alienation, characterized by a pervasive 
tendency in both MS and schizophrenia to experience and relate to the lived body (i.e., body-
as-subject) primarily as an object. In both MS and schizophrenia, the body-as-subject’s 
transparency—the tacit, mediating processes enabling it to function smoothly and 
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unobtrusively in the world—appear disrupted. Although the origin and nature of these 
disruptions are very different in the two conditions, in both cases the body and it capacities 
are no longer simply inhabited or pre-reflectively lived through but rather explicated in a 
concrete, objectifying, and alienating manner. Notably, we also found crucial differences 
between experiences of diminished embodiment and affectivity in MS and schizophrenia, 
reflecting the different underlying pathologies.  
Our study lends support to phenomenologists’ claims concerning the importance of 
embodiment, affectivity, and intercorporeity (or embodied intersubjectivity) for the 
constitution of a sense of self in abnormal as well as normal conditions. For 
phenomenologists, the fluid oscillation between the body-as-subject and the body-as-object 
highlights a ‘bodily ambiguity’ at the heart of our embodied experience: as embodied 
subjects, we are neither wholly subject nor wholly objects, but somehow always both. 
Looking at cases where this ambiguity is disrupted, and the cascade of anomalous 
experiences such disruptions may entail, points to the constitutive role this bodily ambiguity 
plays in shaping our general way of inhabiting, experiencing, and engaging with the world.  
Finally, we suggest that utilizing phenomenological resources to address experiences 
of diminished embodiment and affectivity in MS and schizophrenia may enable us to better 
understand what it sometimes is like to live with these conditions and potentially offer targets 
for future research and therapeutic intervention. For example, interventions striving to 
enforce the individuals’ experience of embodiment could easily be included as part of 
treatment in both MS and schizophrenia. In the case of MS, interventions designed to help 
individuals with MS develop alternative embodied communication strategies (e.g., gestures) 
to compensate for their lack of facial expressivity (e.g., Michael et al 2014; Michael et al, 
under review) seems relevant. In the case of schizophrenia, interventions designed to 
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strengthen the patient’s unstable or wavering sense of self-presence or ipseity is strongly 
needed. 
 
                                                          
1
 This is reminiscent of Celia’s earlier description of experiencing herself in childhood as “a collection of bits”, 
each with their own function. 
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